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Abstract
We study the notion of conservative translation between logics introduced by Feitosa
and D’Ottaviano [7]. We show that classical propositional logic (CPC) is universal in
the sense that every finitary consequence relation over a countable set of formulas can be
conservatively translated into CPC. The translation is computable if the consequence
relation is decidable. More generally, we show that one can take instead of CPC a broad
class of logics (extensions of a certain fragment of full Lambek calculus FL) including most
nonclassical logics studied in the literature, hence in a sense, (almost) any two reasonable
deductive systems can be conservatively translated into each other. We also provide some
counterexamples, in particular the paraconsistent logic LP is not universal.
1 Introduction
There have been several proposals of a general concept of a translation or interpretation
between abstract logical systems, see e.g. [1, 10] for overviews. A minimalist approach was
taken by da Silva, D’Ottaviano and Sette [13]: a logic (deductive system) is given by any
Tarski-style consequence operator, and then a translation of one logic in another is an ar-
bitrary mapping of formulas to formulas preserving the consequence relation. Feitosa and
D’Ottaviano [7] consider the stronger notion of conservative translations, which preserve the
consequence relation in both directions. This avoids uninteresting examples of translations
such as mapping all formulas to a fixed tautology.
This notion of a conservative translation is still very general (perhaps too general): for
instance, translations are not required to respect the structure of formulas in any way, to
be computable, or to preserve any properties of the logic. For this reason, it is natural
to expect that there should exist a conservative translation between more or less any two
reasonable deductive systems. Nevertheless, no result to such effect appears in the literature.
Instead, there are several papers presenting proofs (often non-constructive) of the existence
of conservative translations between particular pairs of logics: [3, 4, 5, 6].
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The main purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that for a quite large class of logics, it
is indeed possible to construct a conservative translation between any two of them. First, we
prove that an arbitrary finitary deductive system L in countably many formulas can be con-
servatively translated into classical propositional logic (CPC), in either the single-conclusion
or multiple-conclusion setting. Our translation is constructed by an explicit inductive def-
inition, and it is computable whenever L is decidable. Moreover, the translation has the
additional property of being most general in the sense that every other translation of L to
CPC is equivalent to its substitution instance.
Let us define a logic L to be universal if every finitary deductive system in countably many
formulas can be conservatively translated into L, so that the result above can be restated by
saying that CPC is universal. We generalize this result by showing that every deductive
system between the →,←,∧ fragment of the full Lambek calculus FL (see [8]) and the
corresponding fragment of CPC is universal, and similarly, any deductive system between
BCK (the implication fragment of FLew) and CPC↾→ is universal. This establishes the
universality of most of nonclassical logics studied in the literature, as they typically extend
(a suitable fragment of) FL in one way or another: this includes e.g. intuitionistic and
intermediate logics, various modal, substructural, fuzzy, or relevant logics, both propositional
and first-order.
As an additional example, we show that Kleene’s logic with truth constants is universal,
whereas the paraconsistent logic LP—based on the same algebra but with a different choice
of designated truth values—is not universal. We also completely characterize universal frag-
ments of CPC: a fragment CPC↾B is universal if and only if implication is definable from
B. (In particular, we obtain a couple of nontrivial examples of logics into which CPC cannot
be conservatively translated, namely LP and the fragments CPC↾↔,¬, CPC↾∧,∨,⊥,⊤.)
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give basic definitions, and we construct
conservative translations into classical logic. In Section 3 we investigate the class of universal
deductive systems, as detailed above. Section 4 consists of concluding remarks.
2 Translation to classical logic
In this section, we are going to construct conservative translations of (almost) arbitrary logics
into classical logic (Theorem 2.4). First we review the relevant definitions to fix the notation.
Definition 2.1 A pair L = 〈F,⊢〉 is a deductive system (or logic) over a set of formulas F if
⊢ ⊆ P(F )× F is a Tarski-style consequence relation, i.e., if it satisfies
(i) ϕ ⊢ ϕ,
(ii) Γ ⊢ ϕ implies Γ,Γ′ ⊢ ϕ,
(iii) if Γ ⊢ ϕ and ∆ ⊢ ψ for all ψ ∈ Γ, then ∆ ⊢ ϕ,
for every ϕ ∈ F and Γ,Γ′,∆ ⊆ F . A deductive system is finitary if
(iv) Γ ⊢ ϕ implies Γ′ ⊢ ϕ for some finite Γ′ ⊆ Γ.
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When discussing algorithmic issues, we will tacitly assume that F is encoded as a recursively
enumerable subset of ω. If X = 〈ϕ1, . . . , ϕn〉 is a sequence of formulas, we will also write
X ⊢ ϕ instead of {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} ⊢ ϕ by abuse of notation (we will never use ⊢ for a sequent
arrow).
A deductive system L = 〈F,⊢〉 is a propositional logic if F is the set of formulas built
inductively from a set of variables and a set of finitary connectives (i.e., F is a free algebra
in a particular signature), and ⊢ is structural (substitution-invariant):
(v) Γ ⊢ ϕ implies σ(Γ) ⊢ σ(ϕ) for every substitution σ,
where as usual, a substitution is a homomorphism of free algebras. LetCPC = 〈FCPC,⊢CPC〉
denote the usual consequence relation of classical propositional logic in countably infinitely
many variables using an arbitrary functionally complete finite set of Boolean connectives
(the exact choice does not matter, as classical consequence is unaffected by translation of
formulas to a language with a different set of basic connectives). In CPC, we will employ
big conjunctions and disjunctions
∧
Γ,
∨
Γ in the usual way; in particular,
∧
∅ = ⊤ and∨
∅ = ⊥ (again, it does not matter whether these constants are included in the set of basic
connectives, or defined by equivalent more complicated formulas, even if they involve extra
variables).
Definition 2.2 A translation from a deductive system L0 = 〈F0,⊢0〉 to a deductive system
L1 = 〈F1,⊢1〉 is a function f : F0 → F1 such that
Γ ⊢0 ϕ ⇒ f(Γ) ⊢1 f(ϕ)
for every Γ ⊆ F0, ϕ ∈ F0. We will write this as f : L0 → L1. The translation f is conservative,
written as f : L0 →c L1, if
Γ ⊢0 ϕ ⇔ f(Γ) ⊢1 f(ϕ).
We write L0 ≤c L1 if there exists a conservative translation f : L0 →c L1.
The translations to classical logic we construct have an additional property which might
be of independent interest, hence we give it a name:
Definition 2.3 Let L0 = 〈F0,⊢0〉 be a deductive system, and L1 = 〈F1,⊢1〉 a propositional
logic. A translation f : L0 → L1 is most general if for every translation g : L0 → L1, there
exists a substitution σ such that g(ϕ) ⊣⊢1 σ(f(ϕ)) for every ϕ ∈ F0.
Notice that if L0 ≤c L1 and L1 is finitary, then L0 is also finitary.
The main result of this section is:
Theorem 2.4 For every finitary deductive system L = 〈F,⊢〉 over a countable set of formulas
F , there exists a conservative most general translation f : L→c CPC.
If ⊢ is decidable, then f is computable. In general, f is Turing equivalent to (the finitary
fragment of ) ⊢.
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We will prove Theorem 2.4 below as a corollary to its multiple-conclusion version. Apart
from being more general, the construction of the translations in the multiple-conclusion case
is more transparent and displays better the underlying symmetry, we thus find it preferable
to giving a direct proof for the single-conclusion case, which feels a bit ad hoc.
Definition 2.5 A pair L = 〈F,⊢〉 is a multiple-conclusion deductive system (or multiple-
conclusion logic) [12] if ⊢ ⊆ P(F ) × P(F ) satisfies
(i) ϕ ⊢ ϕ,
(ii) Γ ⊢ ∆ implies Γ,Γ′ ⊢ ∆,∆′,
(iii) if Γ,Π ⊢ Λ,∆ for every Π,Λ such that Π ∪ Λ = Ξ, then Γ ⊢ ∆,
for every ϕ ∈ F and Γ,Γ′,∆,∆′,Ξ ⊆ F . (Condition (iii) is a form of the cut rule.) A
multiple-conclusion deductive system is finitary if
(iv) Γ ⊢ ∆ implies Γ′ ⊢ ∆′ for some finite Γ′ ⊆ Γ, ∆′ ⊆ ∆.
Note that if L is finitary, condition (iii) can be equivalently simplified to
(iii′) if Γ, ϕ ⊢ ∆ and Γ ⊢ ϕ,∆, then Γ ⊢ ∆.
L is consistent if ∅ 0 ∅. Let CPCm = 〈FCPC,CPC〉 denote the maximal structural
multiple-conclusion consequence relation for classical propositional logic: Γ CPC ∆ iff there
is no 0–1 assignment v such that v(ϕ) = 1 for all ϕ ∈ Γ and v(ψ) = 0 for all ψ ∈ ∆. (In other
words, Γ CPC ∆ iff there are finite subsets Γ
′ ⊆ Γ, ∆′ ⊆ ∆ such that ⊢CPC
∧
Γ′ →
∨
∆′.)
We generalize the notions of translations, conservative translations, propositional logics,
and most general translations to the multiple-conclusion setting in the obvious way.
Theorem 2.6 For every finitary consistent multiple-conclusion deductive system L = 〈F,⊢〉
over a countable set of formulas F , there exists a conservative most general translation
f : L→c CPCm.
If ⊢ is decidable, then f is computable. In general, f is Turing equivalent to ⊢.
Proof: Let F = {αn : n ∈ ω} be a (not necessarily injective) enumeration. We will define
a sequence of formulas f(αn) := βn ∈ FCPC by induction on n. We denote by pn the nth
propositional variable of CPC. We abbreviate αX = {αi : i ∈ X}, and similarly for βX ;
moreover, we are going to use the identity n = {i ∈ ω : i < n}.
Assume by the induction hypothesis that βi have been already defined for all i < n in
such a way that
(1) αX ⊢ αY ⇒ βX CPC βY
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for every X,Y ⊆ n. (This holds for n = 0 as ⊢ is consistent by assumption.) Define1 βn by
γn :=
∨
X,Y⊆n
αX⊢αn,αY
(∧
βX ∧ ¬
∨
βY
)
,
δn :=
∧
X,Y⊆n
αX ,αn⊢αY
(∧
βX →
∨
βY
)
,
βn := γn ∨ pn ∧ δn.
Notice that it does not matter whether we read the definition of βn as γn ∨ (pn ∧ δn) or
(γn ∨ pn) ∧ δn, as CPC γn → δn: if αX ⊢ αn, αY and αW , αn ⊢ αZ , then αX , αW ⊢ αY , αZ ,
hence
CPC
∧
βX ∧
∧
βW →
∨
βY ∨
∨
βZ
by (1), i.e.,
CPC
(∧
βX ∧ ¬
∨
βY
)
→
(∧
βW →
∨
βZ
)
.
We claim that (1) holds for X,Y ⊆ n + 1. If X,Y ⊆ n, this follows from the induction
hypothesis. If n ∈ X ∩ Y , then trivially βX CPC βY . Assume that αX ⊢ αn, αY , where
X,Y ⊆ n. Then ∧
βX ∧ ¬
∨
βY CPC γn CPC βn,
hence by reasoning in CPC,
βX CPC βY , βn.
The case αX , αn ⊢ αY is handled similarly using the definition of δn.
Thus, f is well defined, and by (1) and finitarity of L, it is a translation of L to CPCm. In
order to show that f is conservative, assume that αW 0 αZ , we need to prove βW 2CPC βZ .
Obviously, W ∩ Z = ∅. By the cut rule (i.e., Definition 2.5 (iii), applied with Ξ = F ), we
may assume that W ∪ Z = ω. Let v be the valuation such that
v(pn) =
{
1, n ∈W,
0, n ∈ Z.
We will show v(βn) = v(pn) by induction on n, which implies βW 2CPC βZ .
Assume that n ∈ W . If X,Y ⊆ n are such that αX , αn ⊢ αY , then we cannot have
simultaneously X ⊆ W and Y ⊆ Z. If i ∈ X r W , then v(βi) = 0 by the induction
hypothesis; similarly, if i ∈ Y rZ, then v(βi) = 1. Thus, v(
∧
βX) = 0 or v(
∨
βY ) = 1. Since
X,Y were arbitrary, we obtain v(βn) = v(δn) = 1.
If n ∈ Z, we obtain v(βn) = v(γn) = 0 by a similar argument.
Clearly, the explicit recursive definition of f can be realized by an algorithm with an
oracle for ⊢. On the other hand, since f is a conservative translation into the decidable logic
1Note that the βn are defined by complete (ordinal) induction, which requires no separate base case. For
example, the given definition implies that β0 is one of ⊤ ∨ p0 ∧ ⊤ (≡ ⊤), ⊥ ∨ p0 ∧ ⊥ (≡ ⊥), or ⊥ ∨ p0 ∧ ⊤
(≡ p0), depending on whether ∅ ⊢ α0, α0 ⊢ ∅, or neither, respectively.
5
CPCm, the relation ⊢ is Turing reducible to f (or its graph, if we insist on oracles being sets
rather than functions).
It remains to show that f is a most general translation of L toCPCm. Let g : L→ CPCm,
and let σ be the substitution defined by σ(pn) = g(αn). We have to establish
(2) CPC g(αn)↔ σ(βn)
for every n, and we proceed by induction on n. The definition of βn implies that (2) is
equivalent to
σ(γn) CPC g(αn) CPC σ(δn).
Using the definitions of γn, δn and the induction hypothesis, this is equivalent to∨
X,Y⊆n
αX⊢αn,αY
(∧
g(αX) ∧ ¬
∨
g(αY )
)
CPC g(αn) CPC
∧
X,Y⊆n
αX ,αn⊢αY
(∧
g(αX)→
∨
g(αY )
)
,
which in turn follows from the fact that g is a translation: for example, if X,Y ⊆ n are such
that αX ⊢ αn, αY , then g(αX) CPC g(αn), g(αY ), hence
∧
g(αX) ∧ ¬
∨
g(αY ) CPC g(αn).

Proof (of Theorem 2.4): Let L = 〈F,⊢〉 be a finitary deductive system over countable F ,
and define its conservative multiple-conclusion extension Lm = 〈F,⊢m〉 by
Γ ⊢m ∆ iff ∃ψ ∈ ∆ Γ ⊢ ψ.
Let f : Lm →c CPC
m be the conservative minimal translation from Theorem 2.6. Since
⊢CPC is the single-conclusion fragment of CPC, f : L→c CPC. Moreover, if g : L→ CPC,
then g : Lm → CPCm, hence g is CPC-equivalent to σ ◦ f for some substitution σ. 
Remark 2.7 Even if L = CPC, the translation f from Theorem 2.4 is not (equivalent
to) the identity, since it has the additional property that f(Γ) ⊢CPC
∨
i<n f(ϕi) implies
f(Γ) ⊢CPC f(ϕi) for some i < n.
Remark 2.8 Let us estimate the complexity of our translation f . Assume that formulas are
represented by strings in a finite alphabet and enumerated in the natural way so that shorter
formulas have smaller index, and consider a formula ϕ of length n, so that ϕ = αm for some
m = 2O(n). In order to compute f(ϕ), we have to determine whether Γ ⊢ ∆ for sets Γ,∆ of
formulas whose length is at most n; there are 2O(n) such formulas, hence 22
O(n)
sets. Thus,
we define f(ϕ) by iteration of length 2O(n), and in each step, the formula βi is constructed
from at most 22
O(n)
copies of formulas constructed earlier. It follows that the total length of
f(ϕ) is (22
O(n)
)2
O(n)
= 22
O(n)
.
Assume that ⊢ is decidable in EXP = DTIME(2n
O(1)
). Since each of the sequents Γ ⊢ ∆
above has size s = 2O(n), f(ϕ) is computable in time 22
O(n)
2s
O(1)
= 22
O(n)
. Moreover, if we
compute f in a left-to-right fashion by a recursive procedure mimicking its definition, we need
recursion depth 2O(n) and local storage 2O(n) for each recursive call, plus the space needed to
check Γ ⊢ ∆. Thus, if ⊢ ∈ PSPACE, then f(ϕ) is computable in space 2O(n).
In general, if ⊢ is computable in time t(n) and space s(n), where both t and s are monotone,
then f(ϕ) is computable in time 22
O(n)
t(2O(n)) and space 2O(n) + s(2O(n)).
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3 Universal logics
From now on, we only consider single-conclusion logics.
Definition 3.1 A deductive system L0 is universal if L ≤c L0 for every finitary deductive
system L over countably many formulas.
(In all cases where we establish universality below, it is possible to construct an f : L→c L0
Turing equivalent to ⊢L, as in the case of CPC. However, we decided not to include this
condition in the definition.)
In the previous section, we proved that CPC is a universal logic. The main result of this
section, Theorem 3.10, is a generalization of our construction to a large class of nonclassical
logics in place of CPC.
Before we get to the main result, we discuss some examples showing that the question
of which logics CPC can be conservatively translated into is considerably more subtle than
which logics can be conservatively translated into CPC.
From Theorem 2.4 and the transitivity of ≤c, we immediately obtain:
Observation 3.2
(i) If L0 is universal and L0 ≤c L1, then L1 is universal.
(ii) L0 is universal iff CPC ≤c L0.
Example 3.3 Let A3 = 〈{0, ∗, 1},∧,∨, 0, 1,¬〉 be the 3-element bounded lattice endowed
with an operation ¬0 = 1, ¬1 = 0, ¬∗ = ∗. Recall that Kleene’s 3-valued logic K (with
truth constants) is the propositional logic using connectives ∧,∨,¬,⊤,⊥ whose consequence
relation is defined by A3 where 1 is the only designated value, and the paraconsistent logic of
paradox LP is defined similarly but with both 1, ∗ taken as designated. We have:
(i) K is universal.
(ii) LP is not universal.
(Notice that K without truth constants is trivially not universal, as it has no tautologies.)
Proof: (i): Let f(ϕ) be a conjunctive normal form of ϕ, obeying the convention that no
variable and its negation can appear simultaneously in a clause, and we use ⊤,⊥ for empty
conjunctions and disjunctions, respectively. We claim that f : CPC→c K. Since K ⊆ CPC
and ϕ ⊣⊢CPC f(ϕ), we clearly have
f(Γ) ⊢K f(ϕ) ⇒ Γ ⊢CPC ϕ.
In order to show the converse implication, it suffices to prove that
Γ ⊢CPC ϕ ⇒ Γ ⊢K ϕ
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holds whenever Γ∪{ϕ} is a set of clauses. Let v be a valuation in A3 such that v(Γ) = 1 and
v(ϕ) 6= 1. We modify v to make it a Boolean valuation v′ as follows. If l ∈ ϕ is a literal such
that v(l) = ∗, we put v′(l) = 0; we can do this for all such l simultaneously since ϕ does not
contain both l and ¬l. If p is a variable such that v(p) = ∗ and neither p nor ¬p appears in
ϕ, we pick v′(p) ∈ {0, 1} arbitrarily. After this modification, v′ is a classical valuation such
that v′(ϕ) = 0, and since all literals with value 1 kept their value, we still have v′(Γ) = 1.
(ii): Assume for contradiction f : CPC →c LP. Let {vi : i < n} be the list of all
valuations in A3 such that vi(f(⊥)) = 0 with vi(pj) = ∗ for every variable pj not occurring
in f(⊥). Put ϕi = pi for i < n, ϕn = ¬
∧
i<n pi. We have ϕ0, . . . , ϕn ⊢CPC ⊥, which implies
f(ϕ0), . . . , f(ϕn) ⊢LP f(⊥). Since vi(f(⊥)) = 0, we must have vi(f(ϕji)) = 0 for some ji ≤ n.
Put J = {ji : i < n}. We claim that
{f(ϕj) : j ∈ J} ⊢LP f(⊥).
Indeed, if v(f(⊥)) = 0, there exists an i such that v and vi coincide on variables occurring
in f(⊥). We have vi(f(ϕj)) = 0 for some j ∈ J . If ≺ is the partial order induced by ∗ ≺ 0,
∗ ≺ 1, then functions definable in A3 are ≺-monotone, and vi  v, hence v(f(ϕj)) = 0. Thus,
by the conservativity of f ,
{ϕj : j ∈ J} ⊢CPC ⊥ for some |J | ≤ n.
This contradicts the definition of ϕ0, . . . , ϕn. 
In order to get some insight which logics can or cannot be expected to be universal
depending on their available list of connectives, we characterize universal fragments of classical
logic below.
Definition 3.4 If L is a propositional logic, and B a set of connectives definable in L (i.e.,
L-formulas), we denote by L↾B the fragment of L using only formulas built from B. (We treat
L↾B as having B as the basic set of connectives, regardless of the basic connectives of L.)
A clone on a set X is a set of finitary operations on X which is closed under composition
and contains all projections. If B is a set of operations on X, then we denote by [B] the clone
generated by B. Notice that if B is a set of Boolean functions, then definable functions in
CPC↾B are exactly the functions from [B], hence clones on {0, 1} are in 1–1 correspondence
with fragments of CPC considered up to term equivalence.
The lattice of clones on {0, 1} was completely described by Post [11] (see also Lau [9] for
a modern exposition). We will in particular need to refer to the following clones:
• The clone P0 of all 0-preserving functions (i.e., f(0, . . . , 0) = 0).
• The clone D of all self-dual functions (i.e., f(¬x1, . . . ,¬xn) = ¬f(x1, . . . , xn)).
• The clone A of all affine functions (f(x1, . . . , xn) =
∑
i∈I xi + c, where c ∈ {0, 1},
I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, and + denotes addition modulo 2).
• The clone M of all monotone functions.
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• The clone T∞1 of functions bounded below by a variable (there exists i such that xi ≤
f(x1, . . . , xn) for every ~x ∈ {0, 1}
n).
The following lemma follows immediately from inspection of Post’s lattice, though we invite
the reader to give a direct proof:
Lemma 3.5 If B is a set of Boolean functions, then → /∈ [B] if and only if B is included in
P0, D, A, or M . 
Theorem 3.6 Let B be a set of Boolean functions. The fragment CPC↾B is universal if and
only if → is definable from B.
Proof: Left-to-right: if → /∈ [B], then B is included in one of the clones mentioned in
Lemma 3.5. If B ⊆ P0 or B ⊆ D, then ⊤ /∈ [B]; in other words, CPC↾B has no tautologies,
and therefore cannot be universal.
Let B ⊆ A. We claim that if ϕ,ψ ∈ A, then ϕ ≤ ψ only if ϕ = 0 or ψ = 1 or ϕ = ψ.
Write ϕ(~x) =
∑
i∈I xi + c, ψ(~x) =
∑
i∈J xi + d. If ψ 6= 1, there is a Boolean valuation v such
that v(ψ) = 0. If I * J , we can change the valuation of any xi such that i ∈ I r J to make
v(ϕ) = 1, contradicting ϕ ≤ ψ. Thus, ψ = 1 or I ⊆ J . Since ϕ ≤ ψ implies ¬ψ ≤ ¬ϕ, the
same argument gives ϕ = 0 or J ⊆ I. Finally, if I = J , then ψ = ϕ or ψ = ¬ϕ; in the latter
case, ϕ ≤ ψ can only hold if ϕ and ψ are constant functions 0 and 1, respectively.
In particular, there is no strictly increasing chain of length more than 3 of affine functions
ordered by entailment, hence we cannot conservatively translate CPC (even with just 2
variables) into CPC↾B .
If B ⊆M , we will show CPC↾B ≤c LP, hence CPC↾B is not universal by Example 3.3.
Since M = [∧,∨,⊤,⊥], we may assume B = {∧,∨,⊤,⊥}. Let σ be the substitution such
that σ(p) = p ∧ ¬p. We claim
Γ ⊢CPC↾B ϕ ⇔ σ(Γ) ⊢LP σ(ϕ).
Notice that σ, being a substitution, is a bounded lattice homomorphism of the respective free
algebras. Let A2 denote the 2-element bounded lattice. The mapping π : A3 → A2 such that
π(1) = π(∗) = 1, π(0) = 0, is also a bounded lattice homomorphism, and it preserves (in both
directions) the sets of designated elements.
If v is a valuation in A3 such that v(σ(Γ)) ≥ ∗, v(σ(ϕ)) = 0, then v
′ = π ◦ v ◦ σ is a
valuation in A2 such that v
′(Γ) = 1 and v′(ϕ) = 0, hence Γ 0CPC ϕ.
Conversely, if v′ is a valuation in A2 such that v
′(Γ) = 1 and v′(ϕ) = 0, let v be the
valuation in A3 induced by
v(pi) =
{
∗ v′(pi) = 1,
0 v′(pi) = 0.
Then π ◦ v ◦ σ = v′, hence v(σ(Γ)) ≥ ∗, v(σ(ϕ)) = 0.
Right-to-left: we construct f : CPC→ CPC↾→ as follows. First, we rename all proposi-
tional variables in the style of Hilbert’s hotel so that we obtain a spare variable q which does
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not occur in any formulas. Then, for each formula ϕ not containing q, let f(ϕ) be an implica-
tional formula equivalent to ϕ ∨ q; it exists as [→] = T∞1 . (For a more explicit construction,
we can use the functional completeness of {→,⊥} to write ϕ(~p)↔ ψ(~p,⊥) for some ψ ∈ [→],
and then put f(ϕ) = (ψ(~p, q)→ q)→ q.) It is easy to see that f : CPC→c CPC↾→. 
Remark 3.7 Ideally, we would like to prove that a logic is universal whenever it meets some
simple general conditions, such as those studied in abstract algebraic logic (see [2]). However,
on the one hand, the affine fragments CPC↾↔ or CPC↾↔,¬ are strongly regularly finitely
algebraizable (i.e., as nice as it can get from the point of view of AAL), on the other hand,
Kleene’s logic is not even equivalential. This shows that universality does not have much
to do with abstract algebraic properties of the logic. Consequently, if we want to establish
universality of a class of logics, we cannot rely only on their general properties, at some point
we have to resort to working with particular systems. We at least try to pick as weak a base
system as possible so that our result covers a broad class of logics including most systems
studied in the literature.
Definition 3.8 A residuated lattice is a structure 〈L,∧,∨, ·,→,←, 1〉 where 〈L,∧,∨〉 is a
lattice, 〈L, ·, 1〉 is a monoid, and
b ≤ a→ c ⇔ a · b ≤ c ⇔ a ≤ c← b
for every a, b, c ∈ L. (In particular, a · (a → b) ≤ b, (b ← a) · a ≤ b). An FL-algebra is
a residuated lattice L with a distinguished point 0 ∈ L. The full Lambek calculus FL is
the propositional logic using connectives ∧,∨, ·,→,←, 1, 0 such that ⊢FL is complete with
respect to the class of logical matrices whose underlying algebras are FL-algebras L, with
{x ∈ L : x ≥ 1} taken as the set of designated elements. FLe is complete with respect
to commutative FL-algebras (x · y = y · x), and FLew with respect to 0-bounded integral
(0 ≤ x ≤ 1) commutative FL-algebras. In a sequent calculus formulation of FL, e corresponds
to the exchange rule, and w to the weakening rule. For more information about FL and its
extensions or fragments, we refer the reader to [8].
If Γ = 〈ϕ1, . . . , ϕk〉 is a sequence of formulas, we define
Γ→ ψ := ϕ1 → (ϕ2 → (ϕ3 → · · · (ϕk → ψ) · · ·)),
ψ ← Γ := (· · · ((ψ ← ϕ1)← ϕ2) · · · ← ϕk−1)← ϕk.
If k = 0, it is understood that Γ → ψ = ψ ← Γ = ψ. We also put
∏
Γ = ϕ1 · ϕ2 · . . . · ϕk
(
∏
Γ = 1 if k = 0), and ϕk = ϕ · ϕ · . . . · ϕ︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
. Notice that in FL, Γ → ψ is equivalent (in the
sense of obtaining the same value under any valuation in any FL-algebra) to
∏
Γ−1 → ψ,
and ψ ← Γ is equivalent to ψ ←
∏
Γ−1, where Γ−1 denotes the reversal of the sequence Γ.
Remark 3.9 Let L be a finitary deductive system over countably many formulas F = {αn :
n < ω}. From the proofs of Theorems 2.4 and 2.6 we know that there is a conservative
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translation f : L →c CPC such that f(αn) = βn is inductively defined to be equivalent to
the formula
(3)
∧
X⊆n>k
αX ,αn⊢Lαk
(βX → βk) ∧
(
pn ∨
∨
Z⊆n
αZ⊢Lαn
∧
βZ
)
.
Theorem 3.10 A deductive system is universal whenever it conservatively extends a deduc-
tive system L0 such that
(i) FL↾→,←,∧ ⊆ L0 ⊆ CPC↾→,←,∧, or
(ii) FLe↾→,∧ ⊆ L0 ⊆ CPC↾→,∧, or
(iii) FLew↾→ = BCK ⊆ L0 ⊆ CPC↾→.
Proof: (i): Let L be as in Remark 3.9, we will show L ≤c L0. Put π(p, q) = (p → q) → q.
Using the notation from Definition 3.8, Remark 3.9, and from the proof of Theorem 2.6, we
put f(αn) = βn, where we define inductively
βn := (q → q) ∧
∧
~αX ,~αY ,αn⊢Lαk
((~βY → βk)← ~βX) ∧
(( ∧
~αZ⊢Lαn
(π(pn, q)← ~βZ)
)
→ π(pn, q)
)
.
The first big conjunction in βn is taken over all k < n and all repetition-free disjoint sequences
X and Y consisting of elements i < n such that ~αX , ~αY , αn ⊢L αk, and similarly for the second
conjunction. (Here, if X = 〈i1, . . . , im〉, we define ~αX to be the sequence 〈αi1 , . . . , αim〉, and
similarly for ~βX .) If there are no Z ⊆ n such that ~αZ ⊢L αn, then the last conjunct of βn is
understood to be just π(pn, q).
Since βn(q/⊥) is classically equivalent to (3), we obtain immediately
f(Γ) ⊢L0 f(ϕ) ⇒ f(Γ) ⊢CPC f(ϕ) ⇒ Γ ⊢L ϕ.
In order to show
Γ ⊢L ϕ ⇒ f(Γ) ⊢FL f(ϕ) ⇒ f(Γ) ⊢L0 f(ϕ),
it suffices to prove by induction on n that for every k < n and every sequence Z of elements
of n,
(4) ~αZ ⊢L αk ⇒ ⊢FL ~βZ → βk
(then ~βZ ⊢FL βk by modus ponens). The statement is vacuously true for n = 0. Assume that
it holds for n, we will prove it for n+ 1.
Claim 1 Let 〈L,∧,∨, ·,→,←, 1〉 be a residuated lattice, and u ∈ L.
(i) Lu := {a ∈ L : au, ua ≤ a} is closed under →,←,∧ (as well as ·,∨, but we will not need
this).
(ii) If u = q → q for some q ∈ L, then 1 ≤ u, u2 ≤ u, and Lu contains u as well as all
elements of the form π(a, q).
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(iii) FL proves βi · βj → βi, βj · βi → βi, and ~βX → (q → q).
Proof: (i): Let a, b ∈ Lu.
We have u(a ∧ b) ≤ ua ≤ a and u(a ∧ b) ≤ ub ≤ b, hence u(a ∧ b) ≤ a ∧ b. The proof of
(a ∧ b)u ≤ a ∧ b is symmetric.
Since a(a→ b)u ≤ bu ≤ b, we have (a→ b)u ≤ a→ b. Similarly, au(a→ b) ≤ a(a→ b) ≤
b, hence u(a→ b) ≤ a→ b.
The case of a← b is symmetric.
(ii): 1 ≤ u is clear, and u2 ≤ u (which implies u ∈ Lu) is a special case of
(5) (a→ b)(b→ c) ≤ a→ c.
Put p = (a→ q)→ q. We have p(q → q) ≤ p from (5). Also, (a→ q)(q → q)p ≤ (a→ q)p ≤
q, hence (q → q)p ≤ p.
(iii): Consider a valuation v in a residuated lattice L, and put u = v(q) → v(q). Notice
that βi is ultimately constructed from formulas of the form π(pk, q) and q → q by means of
→,←,∧, thus v(βi) ∈ Lu by (i) and (ii). Clearly, v(βj) ≤ u, hence v(βi)v(βj) ≤ v(βi) and
v(βj)v(βi) ≤ v(βi). Finally, v(
∏ ~βX−1) ≤ u|X| ≤ u by (ii).  (Claim 1)
It follows from the claim that it is enough to prove (4) for repetition-free sequences Z not
containing k. The only interesting cases are those involving n: i.e., Z = X a n a Y or k = n.
Assume that ~αX , αn, ~αY ⊢L αk. Then the definition of βn ensures ⊢FL βn → ((~βY →
βk)← ~βX), hence ⊢FL βn ·
∏ ~βX−1 → (~βY → βk), which in turn gives ⊢FL ∏ ~βX−1 → (βn →
(~βY → βk)) and ⊢FL ~βX → (βn → (~βY → βk)).
Assume that ~αZ ⊢L αn. We have ⊢FL ~βZ → (q → q) by the Claim. Whenever
~αX , αn, ~αY ⊢L αk, we have ~αX , ~αZ , ~αY ⊢L αk by cut, hence ⊢FL ~βX → (~βZ → (~βY →
βk)) by the induction hypothesis. By a similar argument as above, this is equivalent to
⊢FL ~βZ → ((~βY → βk) ← ~βX). Finally, that ~βZ implies the last conjunct of βn follows from
⊢FL ~βZ → ((π(pn, q)← ~βZ)→ π(pn, q)).
(ii) follows immediately from (i), as (ϕ← ψ) = (ψ → ϕ) in FLe.
(iii): We define inductively
r0 := 0,
rn+1 := 1 + n2
nrn,
εn :=
( ∏
αX ,αn⊢Lαk
(β
rn
X → βk)
)
·
(( ∏
αZ⊢Lαn
(βZ → pn)
)
→ pn
)
,
βn := (εn → q)→ q,
where the products are taken over X,Z ⊆ n, k < n. (Unlike the case of FL, we can treat
here X,Z as sets, because fusion is commutative.) We understand β
rn
X to be the multiset of
formulas which contains rn copies of each formula βi, i ∈ X (again, the order does not matter
due to commutativity). That is, if X = {i1, . . . , im} (in an arbitrary order), then β
rn
X → βk
stands for
βi1 → (βi1 · · · → (βi1︸ ︷︷ ︸
rn
→ (βi2 · · · → (βi2︸ ︷︷ ︸
rn
→ (· · · → (βim · · · → (βim︸ ︷︷ ︸
rn
→ βk))) · · ·))).
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Notice that fusion only appears in βn in premises of implications, hence βn can be equivalently
rewritten as a formula f(αn) using only →.
Since βn(q/⊥) is classically equivalent to (3), we have
f(Γ) ⊢L0 f(ϕ) ⇒ f(Γ) ⊢CPC f(ϕ) ⇒ Γ ⊢L ϕ.
By induction on n, we will show that
(6) αW ⊢L αk ⇒ ⊢FLew β
rn
W → βk
holds for every k < n and every W ⊆ n, which implies
Γ ⊢L ϕ ⇒ f(Γ) ⊢FLew f(ϕ) ⇒ f(Γ) ⊢L0 f(ϕ).
The statement is vacuously true for n = 0. Assume that it holds for n, we will prove it for
n + 1. Since we have weakening, it suffices to consider the cases k = n, W ⊆ n and k < n,
W = X ∪ {n}, X ⊆ n.
Assume αX , αn ⊢L αk. Using the definition and commutativity, we have ⊢FLew β
rn
X →
(εn → βk), which implies
⊢FLew β
rn
X → ((βk → q)→ (εn → q)).
The definition of βk gives ⊢FLew (εk → q)→ (βk → q) using commutativity, hence
⊢FLew β
rn
X → ((εk → q)→ (εn → q)).
This implies ⊢FLew β
rn
X → (((εn → q)→ q)→ ((εk → q)→ q)), i.e., ⊢FLew β
rn
X → (βn → βk).
We obtain
⊢FLew β
rn+1
X → (β
rn+1
n → βk)
by weakening, using rn ≤ rn+1.
Assume αW ⊢L αn. We have ⊢FLew βW → ((βW → pn)→ pn), hence
⊢FLew βW →
(( ∏
αZ⊢Lαn
(βZ → pn)
)
→ pn
)
by weakening. Whenever αX , αn ⊢L αk, we have αX , αW ⊢L αk by cut, hence
⊢FLew β
rn
W → (β
rn
X → βk)
by the induction hypothesis and weakening. Since there are at most n2n pairs 〈X, k〉 such
that X ⊆ n, k < n, and αX , αn ⊢L αk, we have
⊢FLew β
n2nrn
W →
∏
αX ,αn⊢Lαk
(β
rn
X → βk).
Putting the pieces together, we have ⊢FLew β
rn+1
W → εn, hence
⊢FLew β
rn+1
W → βn. 
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Remark 3.11 Every consistent substitution-invariant extension of BCK (in the same lan-
guage) is contained in CPC↾→. This is no longer true for FLe↾→,∧, nevertheless one can
modify the proof above to show that (i) and (ii) of Theorem 3.10 remain true when CPC
is replaced with any consistent substitution-invariant extension of FL↾→,←,∧ or FLe↾→,∧,
respectively. We omit the details.
4 Conclusion
Our results (Theorems 2.4 and 3.10 and Example 3.3) show that any countable finitary
deductive system can be conservatively translated into (among others):
• Classical propositional logic.
• Intuitionistic, minimal, and intermediate logics.
• Modal logics (classical or intuitionistic), including variants such as temporal or epistemic
logics.
• Substructural logics, such as various extensions of FL or linear logic.
• Fuzzy and many-valued logics, such asMTL, BL and their extensions (e.g.,  Lukasiewicz
logic).
• Relevant logics, such as R.
• Kleene’s logic.
• First-order (or higher-order) extensions of the above logics.
• Implication fragments of many of the above logics.
This includes most of logical systems (fitting into the framework of Tarski-style consequence
relations) studied in the literature on non-classical logic. We have also discovered some
counterexamples, namely CPC cannot be conservatively translated into its monotone or
affine fragments, or into the paraconsistent logic LP.
While there are still some loose ends left (most importantly, we were unable to determine
whether the logic BCI = FLe↾→ is universal, though it seems plausible), these results show
that the mere existence of a conservative translation of one logic into another without further
restrictions does not provide useful information on the relationship of the two logics, and a
more refined criterion is needed to formalize the intuitive notion of translatability.
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